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Kaplan’s Three Monsters 
	
	
David	 Kaplan’s	 discussion	 of	 monsters	 is	 confined	 to	 section	 VII	 of	
Demonstratives	 (Kaplan	 1977:	 510-2).	 The	main	 thesis	 of	 that	 section,	 namely	
that	 monsters	 do	 not	 occur	 in	 English	 and	 ‘could	 not	 be	 added	 to	 it’,	 has	
notoriously	 proved	 contentious. 1 	Still,	 this	 controversy	 has	 proceeded	 in	
apparent	ignorance	of	the	fact	that	Kaplan	fails	to	provide	a	univocal	definition	of	
a	 monsters,	 and	 vacillates	 between	 at	 least	 three	 non-equivalent	 alternatives.	
The	aim	of	this	note	is	that	of	disentangling	Kaplan’s	equivocation.	After	a	brief	
summary	of	Kaplan’s	framework	and	notation	in	section	one,	I	discuss	monsters	
as	 ‘context	 shifters’	 in	 section	 two,	 as	 ‘global	 shifters’	 in	 section	 three,	 and	 as	
‘character	shifters’	in	section	three.	
	
	
1.	Preliminaries	
Kaplan’s	Demonstratives	 promotes	 (probably	 the	 best	 know	 version	 of)	 a	 two-
dimensional	semantics.	In	this	framework,	an	expression	e	is	assigned	a	semantic	
value	(when	e	 is	a	sentence,	a	truth-value)	with	respect	to	both	a	context	and	a	
circumstance	of	evaluation	(for	Kaplan,	a	pair	consisting	of	a	possible	world	and	
a	 time.	 In	 a	 customary	 notation	 (modulo	 the	 avoidance	 of	 subscripts	 for	
legibility’s	 sake),	 the	 semantic	 value	 of	 e	 with	 respect	 to	 a	 context	 c	 and	 a	
circumstance	<w,	t>	is	[[e]](c,	w,	t).2	
The	fundamental	semantic	role	for	c	is	revealed	by	the	interpretive	clauses	for	
indexical	 expressions,	 and	 at	 least	 one	 of	 the	 semantic	 roles	 for	 <w,	 t>	 is	
highlighted	by	the	clauses	for	intensional	operators,	as	in,	respectively:		
(1)	 [[I]](c,w,t)	=	ca	
[[never	P]](c,w,t)	=	T	iff	[[P]](c,w,t*)	=	T	for	no	t*	
where	ca	is	the	speaker	(‘agent’)	of	c	(Kaplan	1977:	545-6).	Both	parameters	are	
at	work	 in	 the	 case	 of	 intensional	indexical	operators,	 such	 as	 N	 (‘now’)	 and	 A	
(‘actually’):		
(2)	 [[now	P]](c,w,t)	=	T	iff	[[P]](c,w,ct)	
[[actually	P]](c,w,t)	=	T	iff	[[P]](c,cw,t)	
where	cw	and	ct	are	the	world	and	time	of	c	(Kaplan	1977:	545).	
Kaplan’s	 doubly	 indexed	 compositional	 framework	 is	 flanked	 by	 a	 singly	
indexed	notion	of	truth-at-a-context,	defined	as	follows:	
(3)	 truec(s)	iff	[[s]](c,cw,ct)	
(Kaplan	1977:	547).	This	notion	is	in	turn	employed	in	the	definition	of	‘validity’:	
s	 is	valid	 iff	 truec(s)	 for	all	c	 (and	all	model-theoretic	 ‘structures’,	Kaplan	1977:	
547).	
	
	
																																																								
1	See	 for	 instance	 Anand	 and	 Nevins	 2004,	 Dever	 2004,	 Israel	 and	 Perry	 1996,	 Maier	 2007,	
Predelli	2008,	Rabern	2013,	Recanati	2001,	Santorio	2010,	and	Schlenker	2003.		
2	Mention	of	assignments	of	values	to	variables,	and	of	model-relativisation	hereinafter	omitted	
for	legibility’s	sake.	
2.	Context	Shifters	
Towards	the	end	of	section	VII,	Kaplan	writes:	
I	 have	gone	on	at	perhaps	excessive	 length	about	monsters	because	
they	have	recently	been	begat	by	elegance.	In	a	specific	application	of	
the	 theory	 of	 indexicals	 ...	 instead	 of	 having	 a	 logic	 of	 contexts	 and	
circumstances	we	have	simply	a	two-dimensional	logic	of	indexed	sets.	
This	 ...	permits	a	simple	and	elegant	 introduction	of	many	operators	
which	are	monsters.	(Kaplan	1977:	511-2)	
Intuitively,	the	idea	seems	to	be	that	monsters	are	to	be	explained	on	the	model	
of	 intensional	 operators,	 modulo	 the	 substitution	 of	 context-sensitivity	 with	
circumstance-sensitivity.	 So,	 just	 as	 the	 intensional	 operator	 ‘never’	 could	 be	
defined	 by	 means	 of	 clauses	 that	 effect	 a	 change	 in	 the	 circumstance	 of	
evaluation	(see	(1)	above),	a	monstrous	‘never’	could	be	introduced	as	in	
(4)	 [[never	P]](c,w,t)	=	T	iff	[[P]](k,w,t)	=	T	for	no	k	just	like	c	except	at	most	
for	kt.	
That	this	may	be	what	Kaplan	has	in	mind	when	writing	the	passage	quoted	
above	 is	confirmed	by	what	he	earlier	quotes	as	an	alleged	counter-example	to	
his	thesis	that	English	does	not	contain	monsters,	namely	
(5)	 never	put	off	until	tomorrow	what	you	can	do	today.3	
Here,	 the	 intuitively	 correct	 outcomes	 could	 be	 obtained	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 a	
monster-friendly	 treatment	 by	 interpreting	 ‘never’	 as	 ‘never’	 in	 (4),	 thereby	
deriving	 the	result	 that,	 for	any	day	d,	 it	 is	 inadvisable	 (in	 the	actual	world)	 to	
put	off	until	the	day	following	d	what	one	can	do	at	d.4	
I	refer	to	this	notion	of	a	monster	as	a	context	shifter.	As	the	name	indicates,	
context	shifters	affect	only	the	context-parameter,	and	are	thus	idle	with	respect	
to	expression	that	fail	 to	be	context-sensitive,	 i.e.,	with	respect	to	non-indexical	
expressions.	 (For	 instance,	 by	 definition	 (3),	 ‘never	 P’	 is	 truec	 iff	 [[never	
P]](c,cw,ct)	=	T.	According	to	the	clause	for	 ‘never’,	 this	 is	so	iff	[[P]](k,cw,ct)	=	T,	
for	k	as	in	(4).	But	if	P	is	non	indexical,	[[P](c,w,t)	=	[[P]](c*,w,t)	for	all	c	and	c*.	
Thus,	[[P]](k,cw,ct)	=	T	iff	[[P]](c,cw,ct)	=	T,	i.e.,	by	definition	(3),	iff	truec(P)).	
	
	
3.	Monsters	as	Global	Shifters	
In	a	passage	towards	the	beginning	of	section	VII,	Kaplan	defines	a	monster	as	an	
operator	
...	which	when	prefixed	 to	 a	 sentence	 yields	 a	 truth	 if	 and	only	 if	 in	
some	 context	 the	 contained	 sentence	 ...	 expresses	 a	 content	 that	 is	
true	in	the	circumstances	of	that	context	(Kaplan	1977:	510).5	
According	to	(3)	and	to	Kaplan’s	definition	of	‘content’	(in	the	sense	relevant	for	
his	‘Formal	System’,	Kaplan	1977:	547),	if	a	sentence	s	‘in’	a	context	c	expresses	a	
content	that	 is	true	with	respect	to	cw	and	ct,	 then	truec(s).	Hence,	according	to	
																																																								
3	Kaplan	1977:	510,	footnote	34.	The	example	is	attributed	to	Richmond	Thomason.	
4	Given	the	obvious	assumption	that	the	character	for	‘today’	selects	the	day	containing	the	time	
of	 speaking,	 and	 that	 the	 character	 for	 ‘tomorrow’	 picks	 out	 the	 following	 day	 (and	 tacitly	
transforming	(5)	into	a	declarative	sentence	for	simplicity’s	sake).		
5	Thanks	to	Roberto	Loss	for	calling	my	attention	to	this	passage.	
this	 definition,	 a	 monstrous	 counterpart	 to,	 say,	 English	 ‘never’	 would	 be	
definable	along	the	lines	of	
(6)	 truec(never	(s))	iff	truek(s)	for	no	k	just	like	c	at	most	for	kt.	
I	refer	to	monsters	in	this	sense	of	the	term	as	global	shifters.		
Obviously,	 the	 context	 shifter	 ‘never’	 from	 section	 two	 and	 the	 newly	
introduced	 global	 shifter	 ‘never’	 are	 not	 on	 a	 par,	 as	 testified	 by	 the	 fact	 that	
‘never’	is	by	no	means	idle	when	applied	to	context-insensitive	expressions.	So,	
unlike	‘never(P)’,	‘never(P)’	is	not	at	all	equivalent	to	P,	even	if	P	is	non-indexical.	
Similarly,	incidentally,	
(7)	 never	put	off	until	tomorrow	what	you	can	do	today	
is	a	stronger	claim	than	that	presumably	put	forth	by	(5),	this	time	a	claim	to	the	
effect	that	procrastination	is	ill	advised	in	every	possible	world.	
Note	on	the	other	hand	that	global	shifters	fail	to	affect	any	sentence	which	is	
not	 only	 non-indexical	 but	 also	 perfect	 (in	 Kaplan’s	 sense,	 Kaplan	 1977:	 503).	
This	 is	 unsurprising,	 since	 the	 evaluation	 of	 non-indexical	 perfect	 sentences	
remains	 utterly	 oblivious	 to	 the	 peculiarities	 of	 either	 index—a	fortiori,	 to	 the	
sort	of	index-shifting	engendered	by	globally	shifting	monsters.	
	
	
4.	Character	Shifters	
The	passage	quoted	at	the	beginning	of	section	three	is	preceded	by	a	sentence	
calling	 the	 reader’s	 attention	 to	 ‘operators	 which	 attempt	 to	 operate	 on	
character’	 (Kaplan	 1977:	 510).	 According	 to	 Kaplan,	 the	 character	 {e}	 of	 an	
expression	e	 is	 a	 function	which,	 given	a	 context	c,	 yields	 the	content	 {e}(c),	 in	
turn	 understood	 as	 a	 function	 which,	 given	 a	 circumstance	 <w,	 t>,	 yields	 the	
semantic	 value	 [[e]](c,w,t)	 (Kaplan	1977:	 546-8).	 As	 graphically	 highlighted	by	
the	 lack	 of	 arguments	 for	 {e},	 character	 is	 a	 primitive	 semantic	 property	 of	 an	
expression,	 a	 fact	 that	 justifies	 Kaplan	 to	 speak	 of	 character	 as	 the	 formal	
counterpart	of	‘meaning’.	
Since	 character	 is	 semantically	 primitive,	 the	 idea	 of	 (non-trivial)	 operators	
on	character	informally	provoke	a	sort	of	‘meaning	change’,	one	unobjectionably	
expressible	 in	 English	 only	 with	 the	 appeal	 of	 pure	 quotation.	 (Note	 in	 this	
respect	Kaplan’s	parenthetical	qualification	of	his	ban	on	monsters:	‘I	claim	that	
[none]	 can	 be	 expressed	 in	 English	 (without	 sneaking	 in	 a	 quotation	 device)’,	
Kaplan	 1979:	 511).	 In	 this	 sense,	 since	 all	 expressions	 are	 endowed	 of	 a	
character	 (in	 the	 case	 of	 non-indexical	 expressions,	 a	 constant	 character),	
monsters	as	character	shifters	may	engender	non-trivial	effects	on	any	sentence.	
In	particular,	in	contrast	with	both	context	shifters	and	global	shifters,	character	
shifters	may	dramatically	 impact	also	on	sentences	 that	are	both	non-indexical	
and	perfect.	Indeed,	they	result	in	what	is	sometimes	called	a	‘language	change’,	
as	in	a	hypothetical	understanding	of	
(8)	 if	‘leg’	meant	what	‘tail’	means,	how	many	legs	would	a	horse	have?	
that	would	warrant	‘one’	as	the	correct	answer.6	
	
	
																																																								
6	Since	the	antecedent	in	the	English	sentence	(8)	is	not	a	monster,	the	actually	correct	answer	is	
obviously	four	(see	Thomasson	1975).	
Conclusion	
A	 variety	 of	 phenomena	 have	 been	 alleged	 to	 present	 counterexamples	 to	
Kaplan’s	thesis	that	monsters	do	not	play	a	role	in	natural	language	semantics—
attitude	 predicates	 (Schlenker	 2003),	 fictional	 prefixes	 (Predelli	 2008),	 and	
issues	 in	 the	 vicinity	 of	 quotation	 (Recanati	 2001)	 being	 cases	 in	 point.	 Yet,	
Schlenker’s	 indirect	 reports	 involve	 context-shifters,	 Predelli’s	 prefixes	 fairly	
explicitly	 behave	 as	 global-shifters,	 and	Recanati’s	 considerations	 are	 arguably	
committed	 to	 the	 existence	 of	 operators	 on	 character.	 Awareness	 of	 the	
distinctions	between	Kaplan’s	definitions	of	‘monster’	is	an	obvious	pre-requisite	
for	the	analysis	of	the	sense	in	which	this	or	that	proposal	contradicts	Kaplan’s	
dictum,	and	for	the	development	of	a	general	assessment	of	the	role	of	monsters	
in	language.	
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